I thought I'd take a look at the Noscript's XSS filter and see if I could come up with a bypass. The filter is pretty impressive, it was tough to find one. I noticed that it allows function calls to user defined functions such as a, so a vector of ',a(1),' would work fine. This isn't exploitable since you need a function on the page that does something dangerous with the arguments but it gave me a clue how to get round the filter. It was time to fire up Hackvertor and have a look which methods might have been forgotten.

I inspected an object literal and found __defineSetter__. This would work on window since every object has the method. Define setter allows you to set a property with the first argument and the function you want to call in the second argument.

Because __defineSetter__ is a method of the window object you do not need to specify window when calling it. I tried an injection of ',__defineSetter__('x',alert),x=1,' and it worked perfectly bypassing Noscript's XSS filter check in script context. The output of the page would look like this:

<script>x = '',__defineSetter__('x',alert),x=1,'';</script>

Define setter is called on window with a property of x, alert is then called when an assignment of x occurs with an argument of 1

You can also call arbitrary code by changing the alert to eval and the assignment to name. Using name as the assignment allows you to send a payload across domains using the window.name property. Usually you use an iframe with a name attribute of the payload you wish to execute then reuse that payload using the "name" property in the injected site. An example of that is below:

<iframe name=alert(1) src="//somedomain?x=',__defineSetter__('x',eval),x=name,'"></iframe> 

The filter has now been patched and the vector no longer works.